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COMMENTS
OBSCENITY: THE PIG IN THE PARLOR'
Since its decision in Roth v. United States2 thirteen years ago,
the United States Supreme Court has been constantly searching for
the formula of obscenity regulation most consistent with our first
amendment freedoms. This comment will explore the traditionally
offered constitutional, practical and philosophical arguments sup-
porting obscenity regulation and reveal their manifest inapplicability
to the present American socio-political setting. The author will also
examine the impact of Stanley v. Georgia8 on state regulation of
obscenity and show why this decision heralds the arrival of the
"nuisance theory" as the only constitutionally permissible approach
to obscenity regulation.
It seems appropriate to begin with that frequently articulated
anathema-" [O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press."4 The Court has apparently reasoned
that if the material is in fact "obscene," 5 the states are free to
regulate such matter by virtue of their "police powers, ' unim-
peded by any first amendment concepts and limited only by the
due process requirements that the regulation be definite and not
arbitrary or capricious. In the past the judicial scrutiny has not
extended to such considerations as the purpose of the regulation or
the existence of any "clear and present danger" of unlawful action
or other evil consequence. Nor has there been any balancing of in-
terests between the states' right to regulate and the "interest of the
1 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), where
Mr. Justice Sutherland commented that "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing
in the wrong place,--like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
4 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). See also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1964)
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959).
5 As defined by Roth and its progeny: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
Under the Roth definition "three elements must coalesce: it must be established that
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly wihout redeeming social value." A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S.
413, 418 (1966). Note, however, that the scope of this comment is not necessarily
limited to this particular definition of obscenity.
6 See extended discussion in text infra accompanying notes 48-54.
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speaker, or in the interest of society in his freedom to speak." Ob-
scenity simply was not constitutionally protected.'
However, in Stanley v. Georgia,9 the Court retreated ° from
its prior position and held that obscenity is, at least to a limited
extent, protected by the first amendment and "the First and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of
obscene material a crime."" Under authority of a search warrant,
police officers searched Stanley's home for evidence relating to his
suspected bookmaking activity. They found no wagering para-
phernalia, but while searching an upstairs bedroom, the police did
find three reels of eight-millimeter film. They viewed the films, con-
cluded that they were obscene, and arrested Stanley. Stanley was
later convicted of violating Georgia law which proscribed "know-
ingly hav[ing] possession of ...any obscene matter ....
In reversing Stanley's conviction, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing
for five members of the Court,"3 sought to distinguish Roth 4 and all
other similar cases on the ground that they all involved some form
of public distribution of obscene material and not mere private
possession. The Court reasoned that the "right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to
our free society" 5 and, consequently, private possession of obscene
material is protected by the first amendment, supplemented by a
right of privacy. The key to the decision lies in the Court's recog-
nition of the "right to receive" obscene material. Stanley cannot be
dismissed as a mere privacy decision, since the Court spoke un-
.7 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 397 (1963).
8 For a typical state court interpretation of its power to regulate obscenity, see
People v. De Renzy, 275 A.'C.A. 419, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969). The court said:
"Obscenity, in whatever form, is wholly unprotected by the free speech guaranty
of the First Amendment. . . .The several states are free to regulate and suppress such
matter by virtue of their constitutionally reserved police power . .. [a~nd courts
will not hesitate to enforce any valid law against obscenity." Id. at 422, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 778.
9 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
10 For a similar interpretation of Stanley, see Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp.
602, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1969), appeal pending.
11 394 U.S. at 568.
12 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
13 Justices Douglas, Fortas, Harlan, Marshall and The Chief Justice for the
majority. Mr. Justice Black concurred on the ground that all obscenity legislation
violates the first amendment. 394 U.S. at 568. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White
also concurred, but upon fourth amendment grounds. 394 U.S. at 569.
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (1952) and Roth's conviction thereunder for mailing
an obscene book and obscene advertising circulars.
15 394 U.S. at 564.
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equivocally in terms of first amendment freedoms and even charac-
terized the privacy factor as an "added"" consideration."
The Court recognized that obscenity regulation does in-
volve some suppression of the individual's first amendment free-
doms of speech and press. Thus, the states' right to regulate
obscenity pursuant to their police powers must be analyzed in juxta-
position with the individual's first amendment freedom of expres-
sion which includes the "right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth."'" More importantly, Stanley marks
a departure from the "rational basis" approach to state regulation
of obscenity." Still, the most far-reaching implications of the Stan-
ley decision arise from the fact that the Court examined the pur-
poses behind obscenity legislation and evaluated the states' interest
in the suppression of obscenity. Although the Court spoke in the
context of the proscription of private possession of obscene material,
its analysis is equally applicable to the states' absolute ban on the
public distribution of obscene material.
TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OBSCENITY REGULATION
In Stanley the State of Georgia offered, and the Court rejected,
the contention that the justification for obscenity regulations existed
in the states' interest in the prevention of "deviant sexual be-
havior"20 which may be incited by exposure to obscene material.
In rejecting this argument, the Court said that "[t] here appears to
be little empirical basis for that assertion."12 1 The Court also pointed
out that if the state's aim is to prevent antisocial conduct arising out
of exposure to such literature, it could, "in the context of private
consumption,"2 2 achieve its aim through the ordinary and less re-
strictive deterrents of education and punishment for harmful con-
duct."5 It must be noted here that this same criticism of excessively
restrictive deterrents is equally applicable to the states' absolute
prohibition of public distribution of obscene matter. 4 Similarly,
"[i]t is unlikely that the evidence is any greater that contact with
16 Id.
17 See also, Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 151
(1969).
18 394 U.S. at 564.
19 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968), where the Court
held with respect to obscenity's effect upon children that empirical evidence is in-
conclusive, but that it was "not irrational" for the legislature to find a causal con-
nection to harmful effect and therefore the Court's inquiry was at an end.
20 394 U.S. at 566.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 566-67.
24 See text infra accompanying notes 82-85.
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obscenity through public distribution leads to harmful conduct."' 5
Georgia's other argument was based on the proposition that the
state has a "right to protect the individual's mind from the effects
of obscenity. ' 26 This proposition was characterized by Professor
H. L. A. Hart as "paternalism-the preservation of people against
themselves, '27 and it.is the same concept that excited the invective
of John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty. 8 The Court, in Stanley,
summarily disposed of this argument as nothing more than an "as-
sertion that the state has the right to control the moral content of
a person's thoughts."' This, the Court argued, "is wholly inconsist-
ent with the philosophy of the First Amendment." ' Mr. Justice
Marshall characterized the first amendment guarantees as "not con-
fined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a
majority."31 Similarly, the Court's analysis in this regard is appli-
cable to all obscenity laws. Since no state has the right to control
the moral content of an individual's thoughts, it is immaterial
whether the state seeks to achieve this end by making private pos-
session of obscene material a crime or by absolutely prohibiting the
public sale and distribution of such matter.
The above arguments are by no means exhaustive. Professor
Hart 2 presents two theses which have been proffered in the past
as an explanation and justification of the regulation of obscenity in
general. One he described as the "moderate thesis" and the other,
the "extreme thesis." The "moderate thesis" stands for the proposi-
tion that "a shared morality is the cement of society; without it
there would be aggregates of individuals but no society."33 Under
this rationale, the state is justified in attaching criminal sanctions
to immorality because it has a right to preserve its own existence as
an organized society; immorality, like treason, is something which
jeopardizes a society's existence. 4 Proponents of this rationale
often make reference to history showing that "the loosening of
moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration. 3 5 However,
it seems manifestly unreasonable to analogize deviation from ac-
25 Michelman, supra note 17, at 150.
26 394 U.S. at 565.
27 H. L. A. HART, LAW, LmERTY, AND MORALITY 31 (1963).
28 JoHN STUART MILL, ON LmmrTY ch. 5, 114-141 (The Liberal Arts Press, N.Y.
1956).
29 394 U.S. at 565.
30 Id. at 566.
31 Id., quoting, Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
689 (1959).
32 H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MoRAIJTr 31 (1963).
33 Id. at 48.
34 See DEvLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13-14 (1965).
85 Id. at 13.
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cepted standards of morality, not involving harmful conduct, to
something like treason which necessarily threatens the existence of
society. Professor Hart points out that "no reputable historian has
maintained this thesis, and there is indeed much evidence against
it."36 As a proposition of fact, he says, "it is entitled to no more
respect than the Emperor Justinian's statement that homosexuality
was the cause of earthquakes. 37
The "extreme thesis" is a variant of the concept of "enforcing
morality as such.""8 "[E] nforcement of morality or its preservation
from change [are] valuable apart from their beneficial conse-
quences in preserving society.""2 Under this theory, it is not neces-
sary that immoral acts harm anyone directly or even weaken the
moral cement of society. Instead, enforcement itself is of intrinsic
value.4 ° This particular rationale seems patently absurd in terms of
its application to the American political system. Are we so con-
cerned with the preservation of the status quo that we are willing
to forego compliance with one of this nation's more fundamental
premises which accepts the view that the institutions of this society,
whether they be positive morality, the military-industrial complex,
or motherhood and apple pie, are subject to criticism and peaceful
change? It would seem that any argument offered to justify en-
forcement of morality simply for enforcement's sake would have to
fall by the wayside when balanced against an individual's first
amendment freedoms.
The foregoing analysis should make it clear that the tradition-
ally offered purposes behind obscenity legislation are not sufficient
to justify the imposition of restrictions by the state on the indi-
vidual's first amendment "right to receive" ideas. This conclusion
follows whether the restriction be in the form of proscribing mere
private possession or in absolutely banning obscene material from
public sale and distribution.
THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND THE RIGHT TO DISTRIBUTE
If, as the Court in Stanley indicates, freedom of speech and
press include the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless
of their social worth,1 41 then how can the state frustrate that right
by absolutely banning obscene material from public distribution
86 HART, supra note 27, at 50.
87 Id.
38 Id. at 49.
39 Id. at 82-83.
40 See HART, supra note 27, at 49.
41 394 U.S. at 564.
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and thereby make it impossible for the individual to receive such
material? It is axiomatic that the "receipt" of material is an integral
part of the "distribution" of it, and if the former is protected, it
logically follows that some protection must also be afforded to the
latter.42
This concept was recognized by the Court in Martin v. City of
Struthers.43 The Court struck down a municipal ordinance which
prohibited door-to-door distribution of handbills on the ground that
not only was the ordinance an infringement upon the freedom of
expression of the distributor, but also an infringement of the rights
of those property owners desiring to receive the information con-
tained in the handbills. This principle was also recognized by Mill.
Referring to the peoples of many states who had prohibited the pub-
lic sale or distribution of fermented drinks, he said: "[p]rohibition
of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their
use ... [and] the state might just as well forbid him to drink wine
as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it."1
4 4
Thus, there necessarily exists a corollary to the right to receive
obscene material, and that lies in the right to distribute it. It can-
not be denied that obscenity is a form of expression. The Court
recognized this fact when, in Stanley, it said that the first amend-
ment guarantee "is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority. And in the realm of ideas it
protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is un-
convincing.14 The Court further pointed out that "the line between
the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too
elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn
at all."'46 Thus, the Court has recognized that obscenity is at least
partially countenanced by the first amendment, contrary to the indi-
cation of some of its earlier decisions. Nevertheless, the pragmatist
will argue that the panderer and peddler of smut is concerned only
with providing entertainment and reaping financial benefit from his
debauchery and is not at all concerned with the expression of ideas.
But it would be extremely injudicious for the Court or any other
42 See Michelman, supra note 17, at 151-52.
43 319 U.S. 141 (1943). See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301,
308 (1965), where Mr. Justice Brennan (concurring) said: "It is true that the First
Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access to publications. However, the
protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make
the express guarantees fully meaningful. . . .I think the right to receive publications
is such a fundamental right."
44 MiLL, supra note 28, at 108-09.
45 394 U.S. at 566, quoting, Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959).
46 Id.
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body, public or private, to sit ex cathedra and decree that this "de-
bauchery" is not simply the individual's peculiar form of expressing
his discontent with the existing institution of positive morality.4 7
THE POLICE POWER
Recognizing that obscenity problems do, in fact, involve first
amendment concepts, obscenity's delicate regulation must be ana-
lyzed with an awareness that first amendment freedoms have tra-
ditionally enjoyed a hallowed position in our society. 8 Only under
the most exigent circumstances does the Constitution tolerate an
abridgement of those rights. Mr. Justice Holmes proposed that
those circumstances are met only when the words are "of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."49
Nevertheless, it is widely argued that the states may prescribe reg-
ulations to promote the public health, safety and morals by virtue
of their constitutionally reserved "police powers." But what are
the "police powers" of a state?
That imprecise and impalpable phrase, the "police power," has
been the subject of varying and diverse judicial interpretations. For
example, Mr. Chief Justice Taney in 1847 referred to the states'
"police power" with regard to the regulation of interstate commerce
as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions."5 Similarly, in
the Slaughter-House Cases,51 Mr. Justice Miller said: "This power
is and must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact
definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of the social
order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and
47 The American Law Institute's concern (Model Penal Code § 207.10 Tent.Draft #6) as well as the Court's concern in Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463(1966), with the commercial aspects of the transaction and/or the seller's pecuniary
motivation are subject to sharp criticism. If one does in fact have a right to receive
obscene material, how can -the-state limit that right to situations where the individual
acquires the obscene matter by means of non-commercial transactions? The fact thatthe distributor enjoys a pecuniary remuneration should not make the transaction any
more objectionable, much less the subject of criminal sanctions. See H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 316-28 (1968).
48 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Mr. Justice Cardozo
regarded freedom of expression as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom." Id. at 327. Accord, even Roth v. United States, 354U.S. 476, 488 (1957), where the Court said: "[c]easeless vigilance is the watchword
to prevent . . .erosion [of first amendment rights] by Congress or by the States."
49 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5o The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582 (1847).
51 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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social life, and the beneficial use of property.15 2 It has also been
said that "[w]hatever differences of opinion may exist as to the
extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it
may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be
no doubt that it does extend to ... the preservation of good order
and the public morals."53 In 1894 Mr. Justice Brown offered a
definition more in keeping with today's trend when he declared that
the police power would "include everything essential to public
safety, health, and morals."54
A state legislature's determination that its particular regulation
is a proper exercise of the state's police power is not final. 55 However,
the Court has been hesitant to strike down such regulations as being
contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
the area of economic regulation, the Court has seemingly limited its
inquiry to whether the state had a "rational basis" for believing
that the regulation was reasonably necessary for thepublic welfare.
In holding that it is within the state's police power to fix the price
of milk, the Court, in Nebbia v. New York,5" said: "[T] he guaranty
of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained.
57
However, when analyzing a state's exercise of its police power
with regard to personal liberties, and especially first amendment
liberties, the Court's inquiry is not so limited. In Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette,58 the majority opinion ably articulated the pre-
ferred position59 of our first amendment freedoms when it said:
The. test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much
52 Id. at 62.
53 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).
54 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
55 Id. at 137, where the Court said that the legislature's "determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject
to the supervision of the courts."
56 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
'57 Id. at 525.
58 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute case).
59 There has been a split within the Court with regard to the question of the
preference of our first amendment rights over property and other constitutional rights.
For approval of the "preferred position" doctrine see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 650 (1951) (Mr. Justice Black dissenting) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Mr. Chief
Justice Stone dissenting). Contra, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
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more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved.
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the
specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so
far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting.
But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may
not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of re-
striction only to prevent grave and immediate danger .... 60
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Marshall, in Stanley, stated that "the
States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply
does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy
of his own home."'" What, then, are the limits of the states' power to
regulate obscenity? It is not here contended that the first amend-
ment freedoms of expression are absolutes and that no burden may
legitimately be placed upon them. 2 Rather, since one does have the
"right to receive" obscene material and there exists a concomitant
right to furnish such material,63 the state can abridge those rights
only where there is present a sufficient state interest outweighing
the individual's weighty first amendment freedoms.
SUFFICIENT STATE INTERESTS
As has been discussed above, the traditionally offered purposes
justifying obscenity legislation do not furnish that sufficient state
interest. Both the "protection of the mental health of the commu-
nity" rationale64 and the "prevention of harmful conduct incited by
exposure to obscenity" rationale 5 were rejected by the Court in
Stanley. Similarly, the "cement of society" argument 6 lacks em-
pirical proof and the argument characterized by Professor Hart as
the "extreme thesis"6 7 is manifestly inapplicable to the American
political scene. What, then, are those sufficient state interests in the
case where state legislation prohibits all public distribution of ob-
scene material and thereby effectively abridges the individual's first
amendment "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth"?6" Or to posit the interrogatory in Holmesian
terms, where are the circumstances that "create a clear and present
60 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
61 394 U.S. at'568.
62 Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Ginzberg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 476 (1966).
3 See text supra accompanying notes 41-45.
64 See text supra accompanying notes 26-31.
65 See text supra accompanying notes 21-25.
66 See text supra accompanying notes 32-37.
67 See text supra accompanying notes 38-40.
68 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that ...
[the states have] a right to prevent"? 9
The only constitutionally permissible answer to that inquiry
lies in the "nuisance theory." Mill felt that the only purpose for
which society could rightfully interfere with the liberty of action
of any member of a civilized community, against his will, was to
prevent harm to others.7" He said, "his own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant .... Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign." 7 l "Harm to others"
is the heart of the nuisance theory and it is the only substantive
evil that the states have a right to prevent.
PRACTICAL APPLICABILITY OF THE NUISANCE THEORY
The application of the nuisance theory to obscenity would
allow the states to regulate obscenity in order to prevent it from
being thrust upon the unwilling or falling into the hands of children.
While one does have a right to receive obscene material, no one has
a right to foist it upon those likely to be affronted or alarmed by it.
Freedom of speech affords no greater protection to the individual
who thrusts obscenity upon the unwilling than it does to the in-
dividual who would "falsely shout fire in a theatre. 7 2 Similarly,
the state has the right to prevent obscene material from falling
into the hands of children. Even Mill recognized this principle
when he qualified his statement regarding the individual's sover-
eignty over his own mind 3 by specifically excluding children:
"Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others must be protected against their own actions as well as against
external injury. 74 In light of the immaturity, impressionability
and the nafvete of children, they are incompetent to consent to
exposure to obscenity. Along this same line, Professor Louis Henkin
points out that "our society recognized the authority of parents
to educate their children, and the state may protect and support
the right of parents to impose their morality on their children."7 5
Thus, even where the parents' morality calls for their childrens'
69 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
70 MILL, supra note 28, at 13.
71 Id.
72 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
73 See text supra accompanying note 71.
74 MILL, supra note 28, at 13.
75 Henkin, supra note 7, at 401. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), where the 'Court said: "The legislature could properly conclude that parents
• ..who have this primary responsibility for [their] children's well-being are entitled
to support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Id. at 639. But cf.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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exposure to obscene literature, the parents themselves could obtain
the obscene material for the benefit of their childrens' "education."
The important factor here is that the decision permitting exposure
would be made by someone with the capacity to consent.
76
The nuisance theory has not gone unnoticed by the Court. In
1967 a per curiam opinion 77 by the Court alluded to a nuisance
theory. In reversing several convictions, two of which involved
newsstand sales of obscene material, the Court said: "In none of
the cases was there a claim that the statute in question reflected
a specific and limited state concern for juveniles. In none was
there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by
publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it."
7
The great value of the nuisance theory's application to ob-
scenity law lies in the fact that it would maintain the precious and
delicate balance between the individual's first amendment free-
doms and society's right to be free from unwanted exposure to
obscene material. The Court, in Stanley, hinted that an absolute
ban on public distribution may be justified because of "the danger
that obscene material might fall into the hands of children, or that
it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general
public.179 However, that dictum is by no means determinative of
the ultimate issue of the applicability of the nuisance theory to
obscenity legislation. The propriety, indeed the constitutionality,
of an absolute ban must be analyzed in light of all relevant criteria.
Under the nuisance theory, it would be neither necessary nor
desirable to absolutely prohibit the public sale or distribution of
obscene material. Instead, the state would be justified in taking
only those steps reasonably necessary to prevent the substantive
evil that they have a right to prevent, i.e., nuisance. Not all types
of public distribution intrude upon the individual's right to remain
free from unwanted exposure to obscene material. For example, an
indoor theater showing a film previously indicated as obscene would
not thrust obscene material upon anyone, but simply afford the
means by which individuals might exercise their "right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth."80 Contrari-
wise, the pig is in the parlor when the obscene films are shown at
76 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court said: "Moreover,
the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who desire from pur-
chasing the [obscene] magazines for their children." Id. at 639.
77 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
78 Id. at 769.
79 394 U.S. at 567.
80 Id. at 564.
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an outdoor theater. The legislature could achieve its aim by simplyproscribing the sale and distribution of obscene material to minors
and by regulating its public exhibition in a manner consistent with
the individual's right to be free from unwanted exposure. Professor
Herbert Packer suggests that the latter aim might by attained by
the adoption of some special form of identification, like the skull
and crossbones, which would distinguish obscene literature from
less offensive material.8
The states will undoubtedly argue that the absolute ban onpublic distribution is necessary to prevent obscene material fromfalling into the hands of minors or being thrust upon the unwilling.An analogous argument was presented in Stanley, where the State
of Georgia insisted that the prohibition of mere possession was
necessary to facilitate the enforcement of its valid obscenity laws.8"To this, the Court responded that the mere ease of administration
of otherwise valid criminal laws cannot justify interference withfirst amendment rights which are so "fundamental to our scheme
of individual liberty." 83 Likewise, it would seem that less restrictivedeterrents would be available to the states in that they could punish
any abuse of public distribution if it became a nuisance.8 4 Conse-
quently, if the only sufficient state interests in regulating obscenity
are the protection of children and the prevention of obscenityfrom being thrust upon the unwilling, the conclusion is inescapable
that a complete ban on public sale and distribution would be too
restrictive. Although an absolute ban would undoubtedly ease ad-
ministration, that consideration is inconsequential when balanced
against the individual's first amendment "right to receive" obscene
material.85
CONCLUSION
Full expression and disclosure of all facets of life is the essence
of the first amendment freedoms. Obscenity is, in the final analysis,
a means of conveying ideas, whatever their social worth, and thoseideas should not be restricted by the political, religious, or moral
81 PACKER, supra note 47, at 326.
82 394 U.S. at 567.
83 Id. at 568.
84 See text supra accompanying notes 22-23.
85 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan'(joined by Mr. Justice Gold-berg) in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964), where it was noted, with ref-erence to the legislative policy aspects of the problem, that "state and local authoritiesmight well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better served bylaws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children
rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination." Accord, State v. Settle, 90 R.I.
195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959).
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dictates of the majority.86 Unfortunately, the relevant inquiry with
regard to existing obscenity legislation really seems to be "whether
government can espouse one moral code as against another and
apply sanctions against those who write or speak against the
norm. '87 Judge Learned Hand saw the need for judicial review of
morals legislation when he said: "Each one of us must in the end
choose for himself how far he would like to leave our collective
fate to the wayward vagaries of popular assemblies.'
88
California Penal Code section 311.289 makes it a misdemeanor
to knowingly exhibit, distribute, or offer to distribute, or possess
with intent to distribute or exhibit or offer to distribute, any ob-
scene matter. This statute and all similar statutes should be legis-
latively revised or constitutionally construed by the courts to read:
Whoever knowingly exhibits or distributes any obscene matter to
minors or otherwise exhibits or distributes such obscene matter
where there exists a clear and present danger
9 ° that (1) it will be
thrust upon the unwilling and/or (2) fall into the hands of minors,
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Obscenity is as much entitled to protection as any other form
of expression, and similarly it is subject to reasonable regulation
if it becomes or threatens to become a nuisance.
Ronald Hayes Malone
86 WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 28-29 (1958).
87 Id. at 62-63.
88 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
89 "Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes
to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, pre-
pares, publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others, or who
offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a
misdemeanor." CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2 (West Supp. 1970).
90 The Court in Roth rejected the requirement that there exist a "clear and
present danger" that exposure to obscene material will incite anti-social conduct.
Instead the Court simply said that "obscenity is not protected speech." 354 U.S. at
486. However, in light of the holding in Stanley, this comment's proposed "clear and
present danger" test (propounded in terms of nuisance) is in no way impaired by
Roth.
